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Abstract
The results of many observational and experimental studies reveal an economically and
socially important paradox: people sometimes behave morally in certain situations but then
behave immorally (or, at least, less morally) under conditions that differ for reasons that seem
morally irrelevant. These patterns are inconsistent with both theories of rational self-interest as
well as with theories that incorporate stable social preferences. This paper introduces a theory
that reconciles many of these phenomena, including the depressing effects on moral behavior of
experimentally introducing uncertainty, social distance, exit options, and possibilities to take
from or destroy the earnings of others. The theory combines the concepts of moral salience and
conditional altruism to explain not only the paradoxes but also a wide range of classic findings
on social preferences.
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1. Introduction
A pedestrian gives money to beggars but, if possible, crosses the street to avoid them.
Different ethnic groups live peacefully together, until genocide normalizes the destruction of life
and property, as during the Bosnian War. Otherwise law-abiding citizens join in looting during
civil disturbances and natural disasters. Donors in developed countries give to local causes but
neglect more critical need in distant developing countries, where their support could do much
more good. Some people employ uncertainty about climate change as an excuse not to act on it,
even when they support measures to address less severe environmental issues. There are
countless economically and socially important instances such as these of “Dr. Jekylls,” who
under certain circumstances act morally, but then, for reasons that seem morally irrelevant,
behave less morally or even immorally, transmogrifying into “Mr. Hydes.”
Of course, the examples above do not necessarily require an appeal to inconsistent moral
preferences but might instead be explained by a variety of other factors, such as risk preferences,
social image concerns, imperfect information, preemptive retaliation, strategic self-interest, fear
of punishment, or expectations about the behavior of others. Nevertheless, the results of
laboratory and field experiments demonstrate that these paradoxes persist, even when one
carefully controls for such factors. In an initial round that began in the 1980s (e.g., Güth,
Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, Camerer and Thaler, 1995), experimental economists began
uncovering instances of behavior at variance with the single-minded pursuit of material selfinterest. In time, these initial anomalies became the “classic” results, which prompted numerous
theories of stable moral (or social) preferences (e.g., see Camerer, 2003). Then, in the late 2000s,
seminal experimental work, including by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) on “moral wiggle
room,” produced new “anomalies.” Subjects act fairly under certain conditions but then act
unfairly under slightly different conditions in ways that are inconsistent both with pure selfinterest and with theories that combine self-interest with stable moral preferences.
One such anomaly, studied by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007), is what I will call the
“taking effect.” In a version of an experiment called the dictator game, two subjects have initial
endowments of money, and one of the subjects, called the dictator, has a larger endowment and
may anonymously transfer an amount to the other subject, called the recipient. Most dictator
experiments show that most dictators transfer a positive amount. But when dictators are
permitted not only to give but also to take from recipients’ endowments in an otherwise identical
1

treatment, many dictators take, and positive transfers also decrease in frequency. For dictators,
who are fair enough to share in the standard version, the option to take in the second treatment
should not matter, but it often does.
This paper introduces a theory that is consistent with a wide range of stylized facts,
including classic findings about social preferences as well as the newer anomalies that contradict
both pure self-interest and stable moral preferences. It provides guidance about the conditions
under which one can retain a social preference approach and when and how to extend it to
account for anomalies. The proposed theory describes the preferences of a decision-maker, called
the agent, who chooses an action that materially affects a passive person, called the patient. 1 One
example of the class of decisions considered is a donor’s choice about how much to give
anonymously to someone supported by a charity, and another example is the aforementioned
dictator game. In general, the agent’s utility function consists of material utility, which is a
function of the agent’s own allocation, and of moral preferences over the allocation of the
patient. The specific moral preferences addressed here, called conditional altruism, are allocative
preferences that consist of two parts. First, fairness captures the disutility experienced by the
agent as the patient’s payoff falls short of or exceeds the fair amount, similar to inequity aversion
terms found in various social preference models. Second, altruism represents the agent’s utility
from transferring an amount to the patient and disutility from taking an amount from the patient
(or, in the case of a spiteful agent, the disutility from giving and utility from taking). Fairness and
altruism are weighted by moral salience, which is a function of the decision context, i.e., of the
choices and information about the choices. This weight increases with moral context, e.g.,
opportunities to share, and decreases with non-moral context, e.g., opportunities to take.
The paper “Virtue Preferences: Jekyll and Hyde Paradoxes with Sanctions” (henceforth
Konow, 2022a) extends the theory by introducing virtue preferences, which represent a desire to
reward or punish another beyond what is called for by fairness alone. It then applies this
complete theory to classic findings on reciprocity and to additional anomalies, including
outcome bias, willful ignorance, and delegation. It also reports the results of a new experiment
that tests the theory out-of-sample and proves supportive of it while providing additional insights
into the taking effect. The theory is related to the oldest school of thought in Western moral
Lacking a general and commonly agreed upon term in economics for a person who is acted upon by a moral agent,
I borrow the term patient from philosophical ethics.
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philosophy, virtue ethics. Referring to this school, Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) explore how
altruistic acts affect altruistic capital, and Konow and Earley (2008) discuss the relationship
between virtue and happiness. The theory presented here and in Konow (2022a) relates to other
features of virtue ethics, including multiple ethical principles, context-dependent morality, and a
role for preferences over virtues.
Of course, strategic interactions are extremely important, but the theory is formulated
around explaining and predicting behavior in simple non-strategic experiments because of
several advantages of that approach for the task at hand. A growing literature has demonstrated
the external validity of non-strategic experiments for moral preferences quite generally, that is,
pro-sociality in experiments is correlated with important behaviors in the field. For example,
dictator generosity is positively correlated with honesty in the field (Franzen and Pointner, 2013)
and with a willingness to take costly steps to reduce the exposure of others to Covid-19
(Campos-Mercade, Meier, Schneider and Wengström, 2021). In addition, the more recent
dictator-style experiments on anomalies provide persuasive evidence of the internal validity of
the claim that there is something inherent to moral preferences that is inconsistent with existing
theories. Moral preferences are clearly relevant to important economic phenomena, such as
cooperation, but cooperation is impacted by a complex set of considerations, as Dal Bó and
Frechette (2018) argue. Specifically, strategic self-interest can confound inferences about morals
in many contexts but should play no role in non-strategic decisions such as the dictator game. In
particular, “virtue signaling,” or feigning morally motivated behavior for strategic reasons, can
distort signals about true moral preferences, which is another reason for the focus here on nonstrategic decisions. Finally, simple experimental decisions enable the parallel development of a
simple and tractable theory. That said, reference will occasionally be made to results where
strategic concerns play a potential role, in particular, where results from non-strategic designs are
unavailable but experiments exist for which strategic concerns are likely negligible.
A word is in order about what this paper tries, and does not try, to do. It proposes a theory
of moral preferences that is novel, tractable, and capable of explaining a wide range of evidence
on moral preferences, including various Jekyll and Hyde paradoxes. It makes some comparisons
with alternative explanations, but, for various reasons, it does not conduct a beauty contest
among theories. Similarly, it focuses on the consistency of the many theoretical predictions with
numerous stylized facts from previous studies rather than on statistical tests of the findings of
3

those studies, which were not designed to test the theory (statistical analysis of an experiment
specifically designed to test this theory can be found in Konow, 2022a). Moreover, with respect
to its chief theoretical ambitions, I find various theories plausible in the particular cases they
address, so the aim here is not to displace them. Instead, I see this paper as offering a theoretical
framework that is new, distinct from others, and tractable. Moreover, it is comparatively specific
in its predictions and general in its applications to many types of behavior that are impacted by
moral preferences, including paradoxes that have resisted similarly general explanations, which
it traces to a common cause. It might be seen as a generalization of prior theories.
Section 2 introduces the theory of moral salience and conditional altruism. The next five
sections apply the theory to explain effects on generosity of proximity (section 3), as well as
more unexpected effects of uncertainty (4), taking options (5), opportunities to destroy the
wealth of others (6), and possibilities to avoid situations of giving (7). Section 8 demonstrates the
consistency of the theory with numerous classic results on moral preferences, and section 9
concludes.

2. Theory
This section introduces moral salience, generalizes the model of conditional altruism, and
merges the two. In neuroscience and social psychology, salience refers to how an object stands
out relative to its environment, and economists have cited salience in a similar sense. For
example, labeling a choice in a salient manner can increase coordination in experiments, e.g.,
Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (2008) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007). Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft (2009) find that posting prices inclusive of taxes reduces demand based on both
experimental and observational data, which the authors attribute to the salience of posted prices.
Bénabou and Tirole include salience variables in their theoretical treatments of moral identity
(2011) and beliefs about fairness (2006). To my knowledge, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer are
the first in economics to formulate salience as dependent, rather than solely an independent,
variable. They invoke salience to explain the endowment effect (2012) and anomalous consumer
choices (2013, 2016), and they focus on the salience of attributes of an individual good (e.g., its
price and quality). The moral salience proposed here differs in several respects from their or any
other prior formalizations, to my knowledge. I introduce a theory of set salience, which proposes
a simple but novel function that characterizes how properties of subsets, rather than individual
elements, of a set affect the prominence of the subsets. Moreover, set salience is applied to moral
4

contexts, viz., to how morally good and morally bad contexts affect moral preferences and
choices. Below I begin with a description of the decision context, proceed to measures of good
and bad contexts, and then specify moral salience.
Consider an agent, who makes a decision that materially affects a passive patient. This
might be a sponsor choosing how much to donate to a child supported by a charitable
organization or a dictator deciding how much of an endowment to transfer to a recipient in a
dictator game. The agent may take an action, x, from the set of available actions, X. In the
situations considered in this paper, the action is the same as the material effect on the patient,
e.g., the transfer received by the recipient in a dictator game, which is selected from the set of
permissible transfers, 𝑋𝑋. The agent also possesses information that the agent might see as

morally relevant to the choice of actions. For example, a dictator could be informed that the
recipient is socially distant, y, among other elements of the information set, 𝑌𝑌. Indeed, mere

labels or even false information might be relevant. Actions and information are disjoint proper
subsets of the decision context, 𝐶𝐶, i.e., 𝑋𝑋 ∩ 𝑌𝑌 = ∅, and 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑋𝑋 ∪ 𝑌𝑌, which is, in the interesting
case, non-empty.

Moral salience is the weight attached to the agent’s moral preferences as a result of the

decision context. For example, the taking effect described in the Introduction is consistent with
the interpretation that adding taking options to the set of available actions in a dictator game
reduces the weight on moral preferences through 𝑋𝑋 and, therefore, the level of dictator transfers.
The same effect on moral preferences and transfers might be achieved through 𝑌𝑌, e.g., by

characterizing a dictator’s task as an “exchange” rather than a “division” or by underscoring the
dictator’s anonymity (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996). We will consider in future sections various
ways in which qualitative elements of context can affect moral salience, but for the discussion
below it is helpful to think of quantitative contextual elements 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ, e.g., giving and taking
options in a dictator game or the physical distance from the dictator to the recipient.

The decision context 𝐶𝐶 can be partitioned in an additional manner according to the effects

of those partitions on moral salience. Moral context, denoted 𝐶𝐶+ , increases moral salience, e.g.,

opportunities to help another person, such as amounts a dictator may give to a recipient. Non-

moral context, denoted 𝐶𝐶− , decreases moral salience, e.g., opportunities to harm another, such as
amounts a dictator may take from a recipient. Individual elements of both 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 might be

categorized as moral or non-moral, where 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶+ ∪ 𝐶𝐶− and 𝐶𝐶+ ∩ 𝐶𝐶− = ∅. One might further
5

distinguish amoral, or morally neutral, elements, e.g., the possibility of inaction, such as neither
giving nor taking, although for the cases considered here, this can be folded into moral context.
Moral salience itself is based on measures of moral and non-moral context. Define a
function, 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ), of partitions, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , of the context that satisfies the properties of a measure, viz.,
non-negativity (𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) ≥ 0∀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ), null empty set (𝑚𝑚(∅) = 0), and countable additivity

(𝑚𝑚(⋃𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 )). Specifically, let us partition the context into its moral and non-moral
subsets, i.e., 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶+ , 𝐶𝐶− }, and denote the moral measure 𝑝𝑝 ≡ 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶+ ) and the non-moral

measure 𝑛𝑛 ≡ 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶− ). The moral measure is increasing in moral context, and the non-moral

measure is increasing in non-moral context. Distinguishing moral and non-moral context and
constructing measures of them requires, of course, some judgment and depends on the decision
context. In the various applications that follow, we discuss different commonsensical
specifications for these measures.
Now we come to moral salience, which is related to the usual understanding of salience
in neuroscience and social psychology, where salience typically refers to how an object stands
out relative to its environment. Here, I propose a novel specification of salience that I call “set
salience,” which involves collections of objects that are all disjoint subsets of a superset. I focus
on the case in which the context may be bifurcated into measurable subsets. Set salience refers to
the tendency for the subset with smaller measure to have disproportionate prominence relative to
the contrasting subset with larger measure. For example, a five-year-old does not stand out in a
Kindergarten but does in a retirement home. The type of salience introduced here further
specifies a non-linear relationship between salience and measures of the subsets of context. For
example, a comparatively small group of children situated among older people is prominent, but
the marginal salience of the first child is greater than that of the second and the marginal salience
of the second is greater than that the third, etc.
Moral salience is an application of set salience to moral contexts. It describes how
subsets of elements of the decision context affect the prominence of moral considerations and,
therefore, the weight on an agent’s moral preferences. The elements of each subset share some
feature(s), here, whether they are moral or non-moral, and each subset distinguishes itself in this
way from the other. Moral salience formalizes this property for moral preferences. Analogous to
the anthropomorphic example above, the addition of elements of non-moral context to a given
moral context, and the attendant increase in the non-moral measure, decreases moral salience at a
6

decreasing rate, that is, the first addition non-moral context causes a larger decrease in the
prominence of moral considerations than the second, etc. Conversely, the addition of moral
context to a given non-moral context, and the related increase in the moral measure, increases
moral salience and does so at a decreasing rate. Formally, consider the following definition,
which reflects these properties.
DEFINITION 1: Moral salience, 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛), is a function that maps the moral and non-moral
measures of the decision context into the half-open unit interval:
𝜎𝜎: ℝ2+ → (0,1].

It is assumed that 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 0) > 0, 𝑝𝑝 > 0; 𝜎𝜎(0, 𝑛𝑛) ≥ 0, 𝑛𝑛 > 0; and that 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛) is twice continuously
differentiable with
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝑛𝑛>0

𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎

> 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2 �

𝑛𝑛>0

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�

𝑝𝑝>0

𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎

< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2 �

𝑝𝑝>0

> 0.

It proves convenient in the subsequent analysis to flesh out this function in a more
𝑝𝑝

specific form. One expression that captures the assumed relationships is the ratio 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛, which is
defined, since I assume throughout that 𝑝𝑝 > 0. Many decisions, though, involve some fixed

moral salience with variation in only a subset of the moral context. For example, in a dictator
game, variation in the amounts one may transfer might impact moral salience through its effects
on p or n, but there are often some baseline moral considerations, e.g., triggered by the very fact
of being endowed and paired with another person. In such cases, the context contains a baseline,
or fixed, moral set salience denoted 𝜎𝜎� ∈ [0,1) in addition to the subsets of moral context that are
variable, p and n. This leads to the following specification for moral salience:
(1)

𝑝𝑝

𝜎𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎�.

In the cases considered here, I assume 𝜎𝜎� > 0 and/or 𝑝𝑝 > 0. Under these assumptions, this

expression satisfies the conditions that define moral salience: 𝜎𝜎 > 0, its maximum is 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 0) =
𝑝𝑝

0

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝑛𝑛

(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ + 𝜎𝜎� = 1, its minimum is 𝜎𝜎(0, 𝑛𝑛) = = 0 when 𝜎𝜎� = 0, = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�)
> 0,
𝑝𝑝
𝑛𝑛
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛)2

𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2

2𝑛𝑛

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎

𝑝𝑝

2𝑝𝑝

= −(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) (𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛)3 < 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 = −(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) (𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛)2 < 0, and 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) (𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛)2 > 0.

Figure 1 illustrates how moral salience varies with the moral and non-moral measures.

The aforementioned effects of moral and non-moral context on moral salience are reflected in the
properties of 𝜎𝜎 being increasing and concave in p for a given 𝑛𝑛� > 0 and decreasing and convex
in n for a given 𝑝𝑝̅ > 0. Note that 𝜎𝜎� is the greatest lower bound of moral salience.
7

The remaining sections analyze numerous contextual factors that affect moral salience.
Some cases involve binary decisions, such as whether or not to remain ignorant of information
that raises a moral obligation. In other cases, however, there is empirical evidence on the effects
of incremental changes in moral or non-moral context. For instance, moral salience may vary
with the amounts that may be given to or taken from a patient, physical proximity to the patient,
and probability that the agent’s decision is actualized. These cases lend themselves to cardinal
measurement, so that one can observe not only the direction of the effect of context on moral

𝜎𝜎

1

𝜎𝜎�

0

𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛�)

𝜎𝜎 (𝑝𝑝̅, 𝑛𝑛)
𝑝𝑝̅ > 0, 𝑛𝑛� > 0

salience but also differences in the rate of change in that effect.

𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛

FIGURE 1. – Moral salience.
Another practical aspect is that people are sometimes confronted with multiple decisions
in similar moral contexts at the same time. This occurs, for example, in experiments that present
the same group of subjects with similar decisions in a within-subjects design. It also arises,
though, outside the laboratory, e.g., when someone receives multiple solicitations to donate to
different charities. In such cases, I make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1: Let an agent make decisions 1 and 2 in contexts 𝐶𝐶 1 and 𝐶𝐶 2 , respectively.

Suppose 1 and 2 are related, meaning choices are made jointly from decision contexts that are
identical except for some element, 𝑐𝑐: {𝐶𝐶 1 /𝑐𝑐 1 } = {𝐶𝐶 2 /𝑐𝑐 2 } and 𝑐𝑐 1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐 2 . Then the decisions share
the common context 𝐶𝐶 = {𝐶𝐶 1 ⋃𝐶𝐶 2 } with the same moral salience and same measures, p and n.
Finally, let us clarify the kinds of contextual factors that are assumed to affect moral

salience and how and do so in both general terms as well as through some applications.
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ASSUMPTION 2: Moral salience is a decreasing function of factors that increase the perceived
separation between the agent’s choice and the moral consequences of that choice on a patient.
Factors that can increase perceived moral separation (and, thereby, reduce moral salience)
include increases in the set of harming choices (e.g., taking or destroying the patient’s wealth),
the degree of uncertainty about the consequences of the choice, and opportunities to avoid the
choice, as well as decreases in the perceived membership of the patient to a group to which the
agent is morally responsible.
These concepts will be fleshed out in greater detail in the applications of the theory to different
classic and anomalous results in the following sections of the paper. To reinforce an earlier point,
note that, since context includes the information provided, Y, moral salience can be subject to
framing effects, e.g., a dictator’s transfer can be affected by labeling such as whether the task is
worded as a choice to “give” or to “distribute” money. 2 But the effects on moral salience are not
limited to framing effects, since moral salience is also a function of the actual set of available
choices, X, and not just their presentation, e.g., whether a dictator may take as well as give. Thus,
context can affect choices mediated by salience even under perfect information due to
differences in choice sets.
As already stated, the theory presented here weights moral preferences by moral salience,
but, given the rich set of moral preferences, a critical question concerns which moral preferences.
For concreteness and tractability, this study focuses on allocative preferences, specifically, those
addressed by the model of conditional altruism introduced in Konow (2010). The following
discussion extends this model, generalizing the altruism term, elaborates new implications of the
model, and analyzes some implications of integrating moral salience into it.
Conditional altruism has three components: material utility and two moral motives,
fairness and altruism. Material utility, 𝑢𝑢: ℝ+ → ℝ+ , is assumed to be a twice continuously

differentiable function of the agent’s material allocation, 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 . Specifically, I assume material
utility, 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 ), is as follows

2
𝑢𝑢(0) = 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 > 0, and 𝜕𝜕 𝑢𝑢�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 2 ≤ 0.
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎

The “conditional” part of conditional altruism involves fairness, which is conditioned on
See Bergh and Wichardt (2018) for evidence of the effects of this wording on dictator transfers. In fact,
information might even be false but relevant to the agent’s actions, if it influences moral salience, although
providing false information is typically taboo in economics experiments.

2
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the fair allocation to the patient or so-called entitlement. Fairness is a type of inequity aversion,
i.e., it captures the disutility experienced by the agent as the patient’s allocation differs from the
entitlement. The entitlement refers here quite generally to distributive norms, and this is another
avenue through which context works its way into the theory. Moreover, it affects the allocative
decisions of stakeholders, such as dictators in dictator games, as well as of impartial third-party
allocators, or spectators. I make the following assumption about the entitlement.
ASSUMPTION 3: The entitlement, denoted 𝜂𝜂, is the moral allocation by the agent to the patient.
It depends on the salient distributive norm or norms in a given context, C, which can be inferred

from the allocations of spectators in C. In “simple” contexts where no specific norms are salient,
the entitlement reduces to equality.
A large literature on stakeholder and spectator decisions has now established the effects
of multiple distributive norms. The use of spectators to elicit moral norms was introduced in

Konow (2000) and has been employed and elaborated in numerous subsequent studies, including
Aguiar, Becker and Miller (2013), Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden (2020), Cappelen, Konow,
Sørensen and Tungodden (2013), Croson and Konow (2009), Konow (2012), Konow, Saijo and
Akai (2020), and Møllerstrom, Reme and Sørensen (2015). Distributive norms can also be
inferred from stakeholder decisions, e.g., Cappelen et al. (2007), and the norms based on
stakeholder decisions have been shown to be equivalent to those inferred from spectators, e.g.,
Cappelen et al. (2013a). Together these studies have demonstrated the dependence of distributive
norms on the context, e.g., efficiency is relevant in contexts where total surplus is variable, e.g.,
Møllerstrom et al. (2015), equity (i.e., proportionality) in contexts where people choose different
contributions to surplus, e.g., Konow et al. (2020), need in contexts with information about basic
needs, e.g., Konow (2010), and equality in simple contexts that are low in morally relevant
information about differences among individuals, e.g., Croson and Konow (2009, RZ treatment)
and Konow (2000, benevolent/exogenous treatment).
Although the entitlement may be derived from stakeholders, Assumption 3 singles out
spectators for several reasons. Most importantly, spectators provide a measure of the entitlement
that is independent of stakeholders and is robust to very general assumptions about the functional
form of inequity aversion. It avoids the need, otherwise, with stakeholders for a priori
assumptions about the form of inequity aversion or for a posteriori assumptions that might be
accused of selection for their fit to the particular results. Spectator decisions also provide a less
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dispersed measure, since they are not distorted by stakeholder self-interest that differs across
agents. Those very stakeholder interests can also produce biased beliefs about the relevant norm.
Although bias is potentially relevant to stakeholder decisions, the theoretical treatment here
requires only that biased and impartial beliefs co-vary directly with context, and evidence from
studies of both spectators and stakeholders indicate that they do, e.g., Konow (2000) and Konow
et al. (2020). Finally, although multiple entitlements are relevant to certain findings discussed in
the expanded theory in Konow (2022a), the experiments considered here can be reconciled with
a single entitlement, which in most experiments reduces to equality.
Fairness is expressed as a function, 𝑓𝑓: ℝ → ℝ≤0 , that captures the preference of the agent

over the material allocation of the patient, 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 , relative to the patient’s entitlement, 𝜂𝜂.
Specifically, I assume f is the twice continuously differentiable function
𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂),

where 𝑓𝑓(0) = 0,

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑓𝑓�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
−
𝜂𝜂
≠
0,
and
∙
𝑤𝑤
<
0
for
𝑤𝑤
≡
𝜋𝜋
𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 2 < 0.

Agents are assumed to differ in the strength of their fairness preference, which is captured by the
fairness coefficient 𝜙𝜙 ∈ ℝ+ that is applied to 𝑓𝑓 to form 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂). This coefficient is

distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Φ(𝜙𝜙), where Φ(𝜙𝜙) has support
[𝜙𝜙, 𝜙𝜙] with 0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙 < ∞ and 0 < Φ �𝜙𝜙� < 0.5. The assumptions about 𝜙𝜙 help establish

predictions that are consistent with behavior discussed later, viz., that all agents care somewhat
about fairness and that minimally fair types constitute a minority. Note that agents experience
disutility, when patients have more or less than their entitlement. That is, fairness is never utility
increasing, which reflects the idea that moral norms signify an obligation rather than an
opportunity. This is a critical factor later for explaining a number of empirical findings.
The “altruism” part of conditional altruism refers to a moral preference that is personal
and unconditional. As with standard theories of altruism, it is not conditioned on a moral norm,
such as equity or efficiency, or on the behavior of others, such as a desire to reward or punish
deviations from norms. Here I generalize the prior version of this model, which formally
resembled warm glow (e.g., Andreoni, 1989), to encompass not only giving but also taking and
to include explicitly not only positive but also negative altruism (i.e., spite). Unlike pure altruism
but like warm glow, it is assumed to be a function solely of that part of the patient’s allocation
that can be attributed to a personal choice of the agent, e.g., a dictator making a transfer to or
11

from a recipient in a dictator game. Unlike pure altruism, it is not a function of the patient’s total
allocation or of any amounts the patient receives from others. Altruism is also personal in that it
assumed to apply to agent-patient relationships but not to impartial third party, or spectator,
decisions. Altruism is expressed as a function, 𝑔𝑔: ℝ2 → ℝ, of the amount, 𝑥𝑥, the patient receives

from the agent and the altruism coefficient, 𝛼𝛼.

Specifically, I assume altruism is the twice continuously differentiable function
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼)

where 𝑔𝑔(0, 𝛼𝛼) = 0,

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑔𝑔�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
⋛
0
as
𝛼𝛼
⋛
0,
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ∙ 𝑥𝑥 > 0 for 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 0, and
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 2 < 0,

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑔𝑔�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0. Agents differ according to their altruism coefficient, 𝛼𝛼 ∈ ℝ, and are categorized
as altruistic, 𝛼𝛼 > 0, selfish, 𝛼𝛼 = 0, or spiteful, 𝛼𝛼 < 0. The altruism coefficient is distributed

according to the cumulative distribution function Α(𝛼𝛼), which has support [𝛼𝛼, 𝛼𝛼] with −∞ <
𝛼𝛼

𝛼𝛼 < 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < ∞. I assume Α(0) < 0.5 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(0) and ∫𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0, where 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼) is the

probability density function of 𝛼𝛼. That is, I assume a minority of agents is spiteful, a majority is

altruistic, and the average type is altruistic. The altruism term accommodates positive transfers to
the patient, 𝑥𝑥 > 0, as well as negative ones, 𝑥𝑥 < 0, i.e., taking from the patient. The giving case
is similar to warm glow, but this term additionally incorporates disutility from taking. Note that
this term is upward sloping for 𝛼𝛼 > 0 and downward sloping for 𝛼𝛼 < 0, i.e., the utility of a
spiteful agent decreases with giving and rises with taking.

I assume additively separable utility, keeping with most social preference models, e.g.,

Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006),
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Rabin (1993). Letting the moral preference terms be weighted by
moral salience, 𝜎𝜎, the utility of the agent, 𝑈𝑈, becomes
(2)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).

There are sometimes arguments for separate moral salience variables for different moral
preferences, i.e., for distinguishing fairness salience, 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 , from altruism salience, 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 .

Nevertheless, none of the results discussed here depends on such independent variation, so I
simplify the analysis and use a single moral salience term, 𝜎𝜎. Finally, when uncertainty is
involved, I assume that decision-makers are expected utility maximizers.

Since the focus of much of the analysis is on the dictator game, we will interpret equation
12

(2) for the general case of this standard game. Specifically, let X represent the endowment of the
dictator and x the amount the recipient receives as a consequence of the dictator’s transfer such
that 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥. The recipient’s endowment, in versions of the dictator game where it is

relevant, is denoted Y such that 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥. Then, for the general dictator game, we have the
following equation:
(3)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).

I add one more assumption to accommodate a stylized fact of standard dictator games: a minority
of dictators makes super-fair, i.e., larger than fair, transfers. Let 𝜎𝜎 ∗ denote the level of salience in
the standard dictator game and 𝛼𝛼 ∗ the value of 𝛼𝛼 in that game such that marginal altruism equals
marginal material utility when evaluated at the fair transfer, i.e., 𝛼𝛼 ∗ = {𝛼𝛼| 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) =
𝛼𝛼 ∗ ∙

𝑎𝑎

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� (𝜂𝜂,
𝛼𝛼)}. Then I assume 0 < 𝛼𝛼 ∗ < 𝛼𝛼 and 0 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(𝛼𝛼 ∗ ) < 0.5. This implies that a
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

minority of dictators in the standard game is so altruistic that their utility maximizing transfer is
greater than the fair amount.

Now we turn to some theorems about transfers in the dictator game, which will come in
handy in the later analysis. The proofs appear in the Appendix. I begin with the effects of moral
salience.
THEOREM 2.1: The optimal transfer, x, is increasing in 𝜎𝜎.

This is due to the increased weight on moral preferences. As stated above, we proceed from high
moral salience and focus on the effects of non-moral context, n, on reducing salience. So, it
proves useful to establish the relationship between n and 𝑥𝑥, which is addressed in Theorem 2.2.

THEOREM 2.2: The optimal transfer, x, is decreasing in n. Assuming x is weakly convex in 𝜎𝜎, x
is strictly convex in n.

This theorem states that non-moral context decreases giving due to the reduction in moral

salience. In addition, it establishes that, in the case of cardinal measures of n, giving decreases at
a decreasing rate due to the strict convexity of 𝜎𝜎 in n, assuming x is weakly convex in 𝜎𝜎. 3 That

Note that the assumed relationship between x and 𝜎𝜎 is a feature of several commonly used parametric utility
functions. For example, for the standard dictator game, suppose we can write 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎ℎ, where ℎ = 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔.
This formulation treats material utility as linear in the dictator’s payoff, as commonly assumed in many social
preference theories, e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk and Fischbacher,
2006, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Rabin, 1993, and as a special case of the current theory (since 𝑢𝑢′ > 0 and 𝑢𝑢′′ ≤
0). This assumption seems innocuous for economics experiments, where the stakes are usually modest relative to
subjects’ overall income or wealth. Then, it is straightforward to show that, if ℎ = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 ∙ ln 𝑥𝑥 , 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 > 0, then
3
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is, the initial addition of non-moral context causes a larger decrease in giving than the next.
For two reasons, the remainder of this paper focuses on the effects of variation in n rather
𝜕𝜕2 𝑥𝑥

than p. First, theory yields a stronger prediction about n: from Theorem 2.2, 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2 > 0, but the sign
𝜕𝜕2 𝑥𝑥

of 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2 is ambiguous due to the concavity of 𝜎𝜎 in 𝑝𝑝. Second, most of the experimental evidence
related to moral salience is related to variation in 𝑛𝑛. Moreover, the few studies of which I am
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

aware that explicitly relate to variation in 𝑝𝑝 are consistent with the theoretical claim that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 0

but do not involve cardinal measures needed to shed light on the second derivative, e.g., dictator
giving increases significantly with the addition of a short statement about the recipient’s reliance
on the dictator (Brañas-Garza, 2007), and trading volume in an experimental market decreases
when a negative externality is added (Sutter et al., 2020).
Finally, consider the effects on transfers of changes in 𝜙𝜙, 𝛼𝛼, and 𝜂𝜂.

THEOREM 2.3: The optimal transfer is increasing in the fairness coefficient, 𝜙𝜙, except for
super-fair dictators, for whom it is decreasing in 𝜙𝜙.

THEOREM 2.4: The optimal transfer is increasing in 𝛼𝛼.

THEOREM 2.5: The optimal transfer is increasing in the entitlement, viz., 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 1.

Thus, stronger moral preferences generally result in higher transfers. An exception is explicitly
noted for super-fair dictators, who experience increased disadvantageous inequity aversion.

Theorem 2.5 implies that a one unit increase in the entitlement produces a less than one unit
increase in the transfer, which is due to diminishing marginal altruism and the increasing
marginal material disutility.
Now we turn to applications of the theory to numerous stylized facts (abbreviated SF),
including about mean behavior of agents or subgroups of agents, and the distribution of behavior
based on salience, fairness types, altruism types, and action sets. 4 Some stylized facts are
ancillary and simply taken as empirical regularities without proof. But the main SFs of interest
are numbered and accompanied by (and sometimes, as in the first case below, identical to) a
1 2
1/2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝑏𝑏 > 0 and 𝑑𝑑 2 𝑥𝑥�
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑 2 𝑥𝑥�
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎 2 = 0, or, if ℎ = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑥𝑥 , 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 > 0, then �𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 2 𝑏𝑏 𝜎𝜎 > 0 and
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎 2 =
1 2
𝑏𝑏 > 0, both of which are consistent with (weak) convexity of x in 𝜎𝜎, and, therefore, strict convexity of x in 𝑛𝑛.
2
4
One type of stylized fact is not treated here, viz., preference-based masses that are observed in many social
preference experiments, e.g., a spike at equal splits in many standard dictator games, but Konow (2022a) provides
an explanation based on different type of moral salience.
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theorem that asserts a claim about the consistency of the SF with the theory.

3. Moral Proximity
The Make-A-Wish Foundation is a non-profit organization founded in the United States
that uses the contributions of donors to fulfill the wishes of children with life-threatening
illnesses. Although stories of these children being granted their wishes tugs at the heartstrings of
any compassionate person, the philosopher Peter Singer maintains that the resources of
American donors would be put to better use helping people in developing countries (2013). He
and other advocates of the philosophical and social movement called “effective altruism” argue
for directing charitable resources to where they will do the most good. Singer points out that the
average cost in the US of a “wish” (now in excess of $10,000) could, in developing countries,
save the lives of at least two or three children if spent on malaria nets or protect 100 children
from blindness. Nevertheless, many donors in developed countries favor local or domestic
charities over those operating in developing countries. 5
These conflicting moral intuitions are but one example of an important and common type
of anomaly, which, I argue, can be explained by moral salience. This section addresses what I
will call moral proximity. This concerns one of the most important practical moral questions,
viz., the identity of one’s moral group or the set of persons to which one feels obligated to be
moral. Moral proximity provides an explanation for the effects on moral behavior of, inter alia,
physical distance, familial relations, friendship, homophily including by ethnicity or political
affiliation, or information about the agent or patient. These effects often seem so intuitive that
they hardly strike us as anomalous, although it is still sometimes surprising how easily they can
be triggered. And yet they are not predicted by most social preference theories, and I am unaware
of theoretical accounts that are able to cast all the different examples in a unified framework.
Most of philosophical ethics concerns moral principles in general terms and scarcely
addresses the question of moral groups (although there are exceptions, e.g., Walzer, 1983). Equal
moral consideration of all seems noble, but it is self-evident that moral obligations cannot extend
indefinitely, and the boundaries are very much in dispute: some people draw the line at family,
clan, religious, political or ethnic group, some claim we are obliged to our fellow citizens, some
Singer mentions additional (not mutually exclusive) explanations for the appeal of the Make-A-Wish Foundation,
such as the so-called identifiable victim effect. I analyze this effect and its possible causes, including moral salience,
in Konow (2022b).
5
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to the unborn, some to all people in the world, and some also to animals (which raises the further
question of “which animals?”). Even a broad conception of moral group cannot plausibly
maintain that all members of that group are equal: surely, the obligation to one’s child differs
from that to a securities trader in a distant country. The identification of the moral group is
paramount to economic policy. For example, suppose one seeks to promote fair earnings (or
efficient earnings or any other normative goal). The first order of business is to identify the set of
persons whose earners should be targeted: those within a firm, city, county, state, country, the
world? There is also the sticky question of which generations to include, which is critical for so
many policies including climate change, i.e., do we include only the current generation or also
future ones, and, if so, which? There are practical reasons for favoring one answer or the other,
but the moral question must still be factored in, and its resolution is less than obvious.
I will not attempt to resolve these normative questions here, but they are offered as
motivation for the importance of the topic and as inspiration for the current descriptive
undertaking. The economic importance of the topic is suggested by various phenomena,
including by the effects of co-workers on productivity, e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul
(2010). The focus here is on analyzing of how moral behavior is affected by contextual factors
that make the patient’s membership in the agent’s moral group more or less salient. That is what
is meant by moral proximity, and we proceed, as usual when operationalizing moral salience,
from a high salience reference point to help identify the properties that affect salience.
Assumption 2 in section 2 outlined factors that affect moral salience. To elaborate the proximity
aspect of that assumption, consider the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 4: Patients are most morally proximate and, therefore, salient, when, ceteris
paribus, they are physically near, personal information about them is abundant and/or stresses
their membership in the agent’s moral group, they are associated with other proximate persons,
others possess abundant personal information about the agent, agent and patient communicate
with one another, and agent and patient share traits in common, even ones that might seem
superficial and morally irrelevant. In the case of cardinal measures of distance, let the patient,
who is most proximate to the agent, have positive measure, 𝑝𝑝 > 0 and the additional distance to
a more distant patient be non-moral context, n.

Many of the factors that influence moral proximity have often been characterized as

“social distance” (in the pre-Covid-19 sense of the term). For example, transfers rise, when even
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limited information about the dictator is provided to the experimenter (Hoffman, McCabe and
Smith, 1996), the recipient (Bohnet and Frey, 1999, Grossman, 2015), or both (Alevy, Jeffries,
and Lu, 2014). In fact, giving rises, even if the mere existence of a dictator, who remains
anonymous, is revealed to the recipient (Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006). Even three dots on a
screen in a “watching eyes” position, instead of a neutral position, can increase dictator transfers
(Rigdon et al., 2009). Some of these effects can plausibly be attributed, at least in part, to social
image concerns, even under anonymity (see the discussion in the following section of Andreoni
and Bernheim, 2009). Nevertheless, social image does not easily explain other factors that fall
under the rubric of moral proximity. Dictator giving rises, if the recipient reveals one-way his/her
identity to the dictator (Bohnet and Frey, 1999), indeed, even if only the recipient’s family name
is revealed (Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Conversely, dictator gifts fall, if it is revealed that the
recipient is a member of an out-group (Whitt and Wilson, 2007), and Candelo, Eckel and
Johnson (2018) report that dictator transfers to a family member are greater than those to a
community group or stranger. In addition, transfers increase, if recipients can send a message to
the dictator (Bohnet and Frey, 1999, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, Xiao and Houser, 2009).
The variables listed above are not presented as exhaustive, since the question of what
affects perceptions of moral groups is an empirical one. Indeed, the plausible examples of moral
proximity are too numerous to summarize concisely, so let us focus on studies of physical
distance and moral behavior, which are limited in number. In addition, unlike other social
distance factors, physical distance is a cardinal measure that permits not only examination of the
decreasing effect of non-moral context on transfers but also of the predicted decreasing rate of
change. Specifically, consider an agent, who may transfer something of material value to a
patient, whereby the distance to different patients varies. The factor that varies in this context, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,
is physical distance, and 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) is a measure of it. Then, define p and n for this cardinal measure
as in Assumption 4. Further, denote the total distance δ = 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛 and normalize the measure of

the distance of the most proximate patient, i.e., 𝑝𝑝 = 1. Then, remembering our specification for
moral salience, this can be expressed
(4)

𝑝𝑝

1

𝜎𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎� = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ δ + 𝜎𝜎�,
1

1

which, if 𝜎𝜎� = 0, reduces to 𝜎𝜎 = δ. It is interesting to note that δ also captures a feature of visual
salience, viz., the relationship between distance and perceived size: an object at twice the
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distance appears half as large. Consider now recent evidence on giving and physical distance.
SF/THEOREM 3.1: Agent contributions decrease at a decreasing rate with physical distance to
patients (Touré-Tillery and Fishbach, 2017, Dejean, 2020, Kühl and Szech, 2017).
PROOF: This follows from Assumption 4 and Theorem 2.2 under the assumptions stated there.
Some recent studies find that physical distance influences contributions to others. TouréTillery and Fishbach (2017) report that alumni giving to a large private US university is
inversely related to physical distance (Study 2). Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between
generosity and non-moral context for six studies. I will return to panels (c) to (f) the next two
sections, but note now the consistency of the results with Theorem 2.2 across diverse measures
of generosity and diverse measures of non-moral context: they are all inversely related, and the
generosity measures appear convex in non-moral context, 𝑛𝑛, in every case where the data allow

its detection, that is, wherever there are more than two levels of 𝑛𝑛 (i.e., except for d). Panel (a) of
this figure illustrates the results of a regression based on the data of Touré-Tillery and Fishbach

that employs the natural log of distance, which provides a better fit than a linear specification or
a non-linear one that adds the square of distance. These results are consistent with moral

proximity: donations decrease with physical distance at a decreasing rate. The authors report that
the inverse relationship is robust to various controls, including age, income, graduation year, etc.
That said, observational studies cannot rule out omitted variable bias, although they can
sometimes shed light on it. Dejean (2020) studies the relationship between rewards-based
crowdfunding and physical distance. Using a log specification, he finds investments decrease
with distance at a decreasing rate, viz., they are half as large at twice the distance. Nevertheless,
the effect of distance is significantly reduced when social networks are taken into account. Social
networks are consistent with a different kind of moral proximity, but this effect weakens claims
about physical distance, per se. 6 Such issues are not a concern with the experimental studies of
anonymous giving by Kühl and Szech (2017), which permit stronger causal inferences about the
effect of physical distance. Their field experiment finds that, holding other factors constant,
donations to local refugees decrease significantly with distance to their camp, which is varied at
two levels. Their laboratory experiment varies distance at more levels and comes to similar
One should be cautious, though, about trying to transfer lessons from Dejean’s study to the topic of generosity.
Rewards-based crowdfunding arguably relates partially to generosity, given that the rewards are typically uncertain
and not commensurate with the investments, but there is often an expectation of some “reward,” even if only a thank
you note. In addition, the dependent variable in his study is the number of contributions rather than their value.

6

18

conclusions, although the relationship is insignificant at longer distances. 7 Figure 2b shows
average contributions for their laboratory experiment. Although the convexity appears subtle in
this case, that is consistent with the short distances, and the change in the slope is actually similar
to that in Dejean and greater than that in Touré-Tillery and Fishbach for comparable distances.

FIGURE 2. – Generosity and Non-moral Context.
Sources: (a) Touré-Tillery and Fishbach (2017) Study 2, (b) Kühl and Szech (2017) laboratory experiment, (c)
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), (d) Grossman (2015) P&O condition, (e) List (2007) baseline, Take $1 and Take
$5, and (f) Zhang and Ortmann (2013) baseline, Treatment$1 and Treatment$5 dictator decisions.
I will occasionally return to moral proximity with later examples involving non-cardinal
measures. In those cases, the direction of the effect of a factor on salience is obvious and
The effect at longer distances of up to 6000 miles is likely confounded by other factors. Participants report lower
feelings of responsibility toward more distant recipients, consistent with moral proximity, but their contributions are
not significantly related to distance. The authors attribute this to participants failing truly to have constant beliefs
across distances despite the authors attempts to hold all else constant, e.g., through claims about similar per capita
GDP. That suspicion seems plausible, since Germany, where the study was conducted, has one of the highest per
capita GDPs in the world, and their questionnaire results show a much higher focus on people at longer distances
being in need. In addition, Germany has one of the lowest levels of inequality in the world, so even if subjects
believe that distant recipients really do enjoy the same average income, levels of inequality elsewhere are surely
higher, meaning that, ceteris paribus, the distant poor are likely needier than the local poor.
7
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qualitative variables suffice to explain categorical changes attributed to salience.

4. Moral Uncertainty
Uncertainty is present in virtually all economic decisions, and it can often be managed to
some degree. Nevertheless, people sometimes use uncertainty as an excuse to avoid costly
actions that are otherwise justified on both economic and moral grounds, such as taking steps to
address climate change (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013). Many studies have demonstrated the
relevance of uncertainty to economic decision making, including in economics experiments
involving moral preferences, e.g., Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005), Brock, Lange and
Ozbay (2013), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen and Tungodden (2013a), Rey-Biel, Sheremeta and
Uler (2018), Van Koten, Ortmann and Babicky (2013), and Zizzo (2003). In particular, the
controlled methods of experiments can help show that the reduction in moral conduct with
increased uncertainty is associated with moral preferences themselves and cannot be dismissed
as being due solely to other forces, such as risk preferences.
Moral uncertainty refers to the depressing effect on moral salience because of uncertainty
in the agent’s decision context. Specifically, we consider what I will call the “uncertainty game”
in which allocations may be randomly determined by an agent or by default, the latter because
either the agent is randomly precluded from choosing allocations or because the agent’s choice is
not randomly chosen for realization. Assumption 5 specifies the assumed relationship between
uncertainty in this game to moral salience.
ASSUMPTION 5: In the uncertainty game, the probability of default constitutes non-moral
context with measure 𝑛𝑛, where 𝑛𝑛 ∈ [0,1]. Moral context has some positive measure, 𝑝𝑝 > 0, the
value of which depends inversely on the sensitivity of 𝜎𝜎 to 𝑛𝑛 in the selected context. Baseline
moral salience, 𝜎𝜎�, depends inversely on the unfairness of the default.

Thus, this assumption means that the possibility that allocations will not be based on the agent’s
choice lowers the moral salience of that choice. Specifically, salience is reduced as the
probability increases that the agent’s choice will not matter and as the default becomes less fair.
In this framework, the moral measure, p, represents a certain implicit moral context and a
parameter that effectively calibrates the sensitivity of 𝜎𝜎 to 𝑛𝑛. Similarly, the assumption about 𝜎𝜎�

captures the concept that a less fair (fairer) default lowers (raises) moral salience given that 𝜎𝜎 =
𝑝𝑝

(1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎�. Assuming a specific form for the utility function, p and 𝜎𝜎� might be estimated
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empirically, but the theoretical analysis here does not depend on any particular values for these
parameters beyond Assumption 5.
Although numerous economics experiments have investigated uncertainty, I am aware of
only a small number with designs suitable to the criteria considered here. As usual, the design
must involve non-strategic decisions, and probabilities should be manipulated at two levels at a
minimum. Some studies that satisfy these conditions must nevertheless be ruled out because their
design activates risk preferences (e.g., Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010) or fairness preferences over
risk because subjects choose levels of risk-taking (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013). I focus on two
studies that satisfy all requirements while representing two different and important categories of
moral uncertainty. They lead to the following stylized fact and theorem.
SF/THEOREM 4.1: Dictator transfers decrease at a decreasing rate with the probability of the
default. The fairer the default, the greater the transfer (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009,
Grossman, 2015, P&O treatment).
PROOF: The claims about transfers and n follow directly from Assumption 5 and Theorem 2.2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
under the assumptions stated there. Writing 𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛, 𝜎𝜎�)), 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎� = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎� > 0, since 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 0 by
𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎

𝑛𝑛

Theorem 2.1 and 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎� = 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛 > 0.

FIGURE 3. – Uncertainty game of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009).
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) report the results of a dictator game, the design of which
is illustrated in extensive form in Figure 3. Nature (N) first decides whether the Dictator (D) or
Nature will allocate stakes, 𝑋𝑋�, of $20 between D and a recipient (R). Nature allocates with
probability n, whereby this probability varies across four levels within subjects, viz., 𝑛𝑛 ∈

{0,0.25,0.5,0.75}. If Nature allocates, there is an equal chance, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, either that 𝑋𝑋� − 𝑥𝑥0 goes

to D and 𝑥𝑥0 to R or that 𝑥𝑥0 goes to D and 𝑋𝑋� − 𝑥𝑥0 to R, where 𝑥𝑥0 ∈ {0,1} is varied between

subjects. With probability 1 − 𝑛𝑛, the allocations will follow the decision of D, who can choose
any amount, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 = [0,20]. Consider panel c of Figure 2, which was introduced in the prior
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section and shows the results of logarithmic regressions of the fraction of stakes transferred by D
to R on n for 𝑥𝑥0 = 0 and 𝑥𝑥0 = 1, separately. The slope and rate of change in fractional transfers
are consistent with the predictions: transfers decrease with the probability of the default at a

decreasing rate. The pattern of transfers is also consistent with the predicted effect of the fairness
of the default: the curve for the fairer 𝑥𝑥0 = 1 treatment lies above the one for 𝑥𝑥0 = 0.

Note that, if D finds him/herself in this branch of the game tree, the decision is entirely ex

post. That is, the uncertainty has been resolved, and D knows with certainty that his/her transfer
will be realized. This type of uncertainty should not matter in standard social preference theories.
Andreoni and Bernheim make a persuasive case, however, for their theory of social image that is
consistent with the results of this experiment. My aim here is not to fault the social image
argument, which I find credible in this instance, indeed, the two accounts are not mutually
exclusive. I note now six strengths of an explanation based on moral salience.
First, the moral uncertainty argument does not require that the agent’s action set, 𝑋𝑋, be

subject to uncertainty, because moral salience can be affected by information about uncertainty
in the decision context, Y. This explains how non-moral elements of Y can reduce moral salience,
even when, as in this experiment, decisions are ex post. According to this account, an experiment
in which one subject might have been randomly chosen to receive an unfair share of (almost) all
of the stakes diminishes the prominence of moral considerations and, therefore, of moral
preferences. Thus, it predicts the reduction in giving as the probability of the default increases.
Second, and along the same lines, it predicts reduced giving as the default becomes less fair.
Moral salience has four additional and attractive features that are unique. Third, it can explain
not only the decrease in x with n but also the decreasing rate of change. Fourth, it explains the
increase in x with 𝑥𝑥0 among those Ds giving more than 𝑥𝑥0 due to higher fixed moral salience.

This effect is not predicted by, and, in fact, is inconsistent with, social image, which predicts that
the higher transfer when 𝑥𝑥0 = 1 should be due solely to the shift by Ds, who would otherwise
give zero at 𝑥𝑥0 = 0. Fifth, the theory is simple and parsimonious. Sixth, moral salience is

consistent with a wide range of other anomalies that are not predicted by alternative accounts
such as social image. 8

Grossman (2015) reports a variation on a dictator experiment designed to test his theory
Moral point salience, which is discussed in Konow (2022a), presents an additional salience-based argument
consistent with the higher average transfers when 𝑥𝑥0 = 1 than when 𝑥𝑥0 = 0 as well as for masses at those values.
8
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of social-image and self-image. Dictators not only make ex post decisions, which follow the
resolution of some uncertainty as in Andreoni and Bernheim, but also face ex ante uncertainty.
The experimental design in illustrated is Figure 4. This is a binary dictator game with only two
possible pairs of payoffs to D,R of (H,L) or (F,F), where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 < 2𝐹𝐹,

specifically, in Grossman (2015), 𝐻𝐻 = 7, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝐿𝐿 = 1. Nature first determines with equal

probability, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, which of two games the dictator will play, 1 or 2, and this random

assignment is common knowledge. These games differ based on whether the default is Fair, i.e.,
(F,F), in game 1 or Unfair, i.e., (H,L), in game 2. Subjects are randomly assigned one of two
2

probabilities of the default obtaining, 𝑛𝑛 ∈ {0, 3}, which is also common knowledge. Dictators

choose the payoffs ex ante in the event their decision is chosen, either the Unfair option A (A1 in
game 1 or A2 in game 2) or the Fair option B (B1 in game 1 and B2 in game 2).

FIGURE 4. – Uncertainty game of Grossman (2015).
Ds make these decisions in three treatments of a between-subjects design that differ with
respect to the information that is available to Rs. They can observe the D’s choice (C), the
outcome (O) or both the probability and outcome (P&O). Comparing variation in the fraction of
Fair choices with probabilities in the three treatments, the results produce little support for selfimage and mixed results on social image. On the other hand, the results are significantly
consistent with most predictions of moral uncertainty in two of three treatments (C, P&O) and
insignificantly opposite it in the third (O). This last fact is perhaps because social image concerns
muddy the waters somewhat, especially, where they are predicted to do so in O. The results of
the treatment with the information conditions closest to the standard dictator game (viz., P&O)
are summarized in panel d of Figure 2. This shows that the average transfer to R, or equivalently
here, the fraction of Ds choosing Fair, decreases with n, and the fairer default results in higher
average transfers and a flatter slope. Note that there is one claim of Theorem 2.2 to which the
Grossman study cannot speak: since these experiments only vary the probability of the default at
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two levels, these results cannot shed light on the rate of change of x with n.

5. The Taking Effect
During civil disturbances and natural disasters, otherwise law-abiding citizens sometimes
join in looting (e.g., Green, 2007, Khazan, 6/2/2020, The Atlantic, Quarantelli and Dynes, 1968).
Scholars have offered many explanations for such behavior, but the results of economics
experiments have demonstrated that extrinsic incentives, such as reduced expectations of being
punished, cannot, at least solely, explain such abandonment of morals, when opportunities to
take from others are offered. Consider an anonymous between-subjects dictator game, in which
Rs are also endowed but at a lower level than Ds, and Ds are permitted not only to give in a
“Give” treatment but also to take in an otherwise equivalent “Take” treatment. The results show
that some Ds take money from Rs in the Take version. Of course, this might be due to Ds, who
in the Give version are otherwise constrained to a corner solution at zero, but that does not
explain the lower fraction of Ds who choose positive transfers in the Take version versus the
Give version (Bardsley, 2008, List, 2007). This taking effect means that the addition of taking
options results in givers being less generous, indeed, some givers become takers.
The taking effect can be seen as one example of a class of anomalies involving the
distinction between helping versus harming others (another example is analyzed in the next
section). I make the following general assumption about this class of anomalies.
ASSUMPTION 6: In contexts where 𝑝𝑝 > 0, moral salience is increasing the set of helping

choices, which involves increasing the payoffs of others, and 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0 and is increasing the set of
harming choices, which involves decreasing the payoffs of others.

The allocative preference that relates most directly to helping and harming is altruism, so some

explanations rest on differences across agents in altruism. Although altruism salience is plausibly
more important than fairness salience for explaining helping and harming anomalies, that is not a
necessary assumption for the claims except for lesser part of one theorem in the next section.
In dictator games with taking, giving is moral context, and taking is non-moral context.
The following assumption fleshes out Assumption 6 for such games.
ASSUMPTION 7: Consider a dictator game where Ds and Rs are endowed with X and Y (𝑋𝑋 >
𝑌𝑌 > 0), and where giving options may be in any amounts from 0 to the maximum and taking

options in any amounts from 0 to the minimum. For concreteness, suppose the moral measure is
24

𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = max{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 } − min{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 }, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶+ , 𝐶𝐶− }, where 𝐶𝐶+ is the set of non-negative
transfers from D to R and 𝐶𝐶− the set of negative transfers, i.e., transfers from R to D.

I summarize below many of the rich findings from experiments with taking and propose

explanations for them based on moral salience.

SF/THEOREM 5.1: Consider a standard between-subjects dictator game with endowed Ds and
Rs, where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0. Adding taking options to this game reduces giving on both the
intensive and extensive margins, i.e., the mean transfer and the frequency of positive
transfers fall (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013b, Cox et al., 2019). Mean transfers fall with

taking options at a decreasing rate, i.e., less than proportionately (Bardsley, 2008,
Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2014, List, 2007, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013). The
taking effect diminishes, if the D’s choice is observable to the experimenter and other
subjects (Alevy, Jeffries, and Lu, 2014).
PROOF: By Assumption 7, adding taking options reduces moral salience, say, from 𝜎𝜎 ℎ to 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 . By
Theorem 2.1, all dictators for whom 𝑥𝑥 > 0 under 𝜎𝜎 ℎ , transfer a lower amount under 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 .

Those, whose preferred transfer is constrained at zero under 𝜎𝜎 ℎ , take under 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 . The effect
on transfers is less than proportional with taking options from Theorem 2.2. The effect of
observability follows from Assumption 4 and Theorem 2.1.

The results of two studies that vary taking options are presented in panels e and f of Figure 2
(List, 2007, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013, respectively). These illustrate a less than proportionate
decline in mean transfers with taking options.
Some dictator experiments vary the endowments of Ds and Rs along with giving and
taking options. Specifically, several allow comparisons between a giving game, that is, a
standard dictator game where the total endowment, 𝑀𝑀, is initially all given to the D (𝑋𝑋 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑌𝑌 =
0) and giving is unrestricted, with a taking game, in which 𝑀𝑀 is provisionally allocated to the R

(𝑌𝑌 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑋𝑋 = 0) and D taking is unrestricted. Consider now some stylized facts of such games.

SF 5.2: In a between-subjects design, where subjects choose under only one condition, R payoffs
(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥) do not differ significantly between the giving and taking games

(Chowdury, Jeon, and Saha, 2017, Dreber et al., 2013, Grossman and Eckel, 2015,
Korenok, Millner, and Razzolini, 2014, Smith, 2015). In a within-subjects design, where
subjects choose under both conditions, R payoffs are lower in the giving game than the
taking game, and, given a choice between playing the giving or taking game, most Ds
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prefer the giving game (86% in Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2018).
The utility functions of Ds in the giving and taking games can be written, respectively, as
𝑈𝑈 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑀𝑀 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼),

𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑀𝑀 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑀𝑀, 𝛼𝛼).

That is, for a given x, the D’s utility is the same except for the final altruism terms, which reflect
the utility gain from giving from the agent’s endowment, in the first case, versus the utility loss
from taking from the patient’s endowment, in the second. This leads to the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.2: In a between-subjects design, it is indeterminate, whether R payoffs will be
higher in the giving or the taking game. In a within-subjects design, mean R payoffs are
higher in the taking game, and, given the choice between the two games, altruistic Ds,
who constitute the majority, prefer the giving game, whereas spiteful Ds prefer the taking
game.
PROOF: In a within-subjects design, salience is the same for both decisions by Assumption 1.
By the concavity of 𝑔𝑔,

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑀𝑀, 𝛼𝛼)�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼)�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 >
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕, which implies a larger 𝑥𝑥, and,

therefore, larger R payoffs, in the taking game. By inspection, 𝑈𝑈 𝐺𝐺 |𝛼𝛼>0 > 𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇 |𝛼𝛼>0 and

𝑈𝑈 𝐺𝐺 |𝛼𝛼<0 < 𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇 |𝛼𝛼<0 , meaning altruistic (spiteful) Ds prefer the giving (taking) game. In a

between-subjects design, salience is lower in the taking game due to the high non-moral
context (𝜎𝜎 𝑇𝑇 < 𝜎𝜎 𝐺𝐺 ), which, ceteris paribus, implies a lower 𝑥𝑥 by Theorem 2.1. Thus, the

two effects operate in opposite directions in a between-subjects design such that the
overall effect on giving is theoretically indeterminate.

Thus, in the absence of a salience effect, transfers should be larger in the taking game, which is,
in fact, what one observes in the within-subjects design. But when moral salience is lower in the
between-subjects taking game, the effect on 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 is ambiguous. Although indeterminacy is a
nonspecific prediction, it is inconsistent with theory in the absence of salience, and it is

consistent with the insignificant differences in 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 in this case compared to the higher 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 in the

taking game in the within-subjects design. Note that this theorem implies only spiteful agents
prefer the taking game, which the Korenok et al. study cited in SF 5.2 implies is at 14%.
Numerous explanations have been offered for the taking effect. Bardsley (2008)
conjectures that it is an experimental artefact, viz., an experimenter demand effect, that is, a
desire to please the experimenter. In this context, subjects view the offered choice set as

signaling what the experimenter wishes the subject to do. But in a recent and rigorous analysis of
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experimenter demand effects, de Quidt, Haushofer and Roth (2018) find such effects to be
modest, and they do not seem plausibly to explain the large magnitude of the taking effect.
Cappelen et al. (2013b) test whether the choice set signals entitlements, e.g., a taking opportunity
might signal the D is morally entitled to do so. But they find that reinforcing entitlements with a
real task has no significant effect while the taking effect remains. Korenok, Millner and
Razzolini (2012, 2018) point to warm glow and taking aversion (or an endowment effect) and,
indeed, altruism in the current model is equivalent to the melding of these two effects.
Nevertheless, that alone does not explain the between- versus within-subjects differences. Alevy
et al. (2014) argue their results on observability and gender are consistent with social- and selfsignaling. As previously discussed, I consider signaling arguments credible, but the present
framework is offered as a simpler account, which also explains the observability effect in terms
of moral salience, specifically, moral proximity.
List (2007) proposes a “moral cost function,” which Cox et al. (2019) formalize. They
propose and test experimentally a theory with moral reference points that depend on choice sets.
Despite differences in theoretical formulation and some differences in predictions, I view the
current project as having points in common with Cox et al., which along with Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov (2016) and Krupka and Weber (2013), underscore the importance of the changes
in agent sensitivity to the violation of moral norms based on differences in choice sets. Whereas
these approaches assume certain changes in norms and sensitivity to norms, the present theory
derives these and other patterns from a general theory of stable moral norms and contextdependent moral salience.

6. Joy of Destruction
People sometimes destroy the wealth of others at a personal cost, often risking
punishment and obtaining no material benefit to themselves, e.g., some people vandalize
property or write computer viruses. There are examples of people, who cooperate over
generations but suddenly begin engaging in destructive behavior toward one another. For
instance, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks lived peaceably, often intermarrying, prior to the breakup
of Yugoslavia, but subsequently turned on one another, and over 100,000 lives were lost and vast
amounts of property destroyed in the Bosnian War. Depending on the particular case, such
behavior might be attributed to ethnic hostility, preemptive retaliation, revenge, etc. Economics
experiments, however, have documented that, even when such motives can be ruled out by
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design, some people are willing to incur a cost to destroy the wealth of others and that such
behavior can be easily triggered.
Various “money-burning” games have found that up to almost one-half of subjects acting
individually in simultaneous games with unequal endowments destroy earnings of other
members of their group, e.g., Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Abbink and Sadrieh (2009), Abbink and
Hermann (2011). Similar behavior is observed, when players interact over multiple periods in socalled “vendetta” games, e.g., Abbink and Herrmann (2009), Bolle, Tan and Zizzo (2014). In
these studies, however, one cannot rule out motives other than a pure desire to destroy. When
endowments are unequal, subjects can be motivated by inequality aversion to destroy. Moreover,
as we will see, relatively few subjects destroy in non-strategic decisions (13-15%), but a much
higher percentage expect others to destroy (38% in Abbink and Herrmann, 2011), which is
consistent with preemptive retaliation in these experiments. Thus, we will focus, as usual, on
simple, non-strategic decisions in the cases that follow, such as non-strategic versions of the
“joy-of-destruction” (or JD) game, which resembles a dictator game, in that it is unilateral, but
with options to destroy others’ endowments. In the standard version, endowments are equal, and
agents can destroy at zero cost, and zero benefit, to themselves. 9 The utility function of the agent
in a non-strategic JD game can be written
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).

In the standard JD game, 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0, the context is simple and stakes are fixed, so we assume equal
endowments, i.e., 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌 = 𝜂𝜂 = 𝑀𝑀/2, where 𝑀𝑀 = 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌. We will then consider cases where

endowments are unequal and the agent may destroy or create money for the patient, i.e., 𝑥𝑥 can be

positive or negative.

SF 6.1: In the standard non-strategic JD game with symmetric endowments, a minority of agents

engages in destruction (13% in Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013, 15% in Kessler, Ruiz-Martos
and Skuse, 2012, and only 13% even in the strategic game of Abbink and Herrmann,
2009).
THEOREM 6.1: In the standard non-strategic JD game with 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌, only a minority, consisting
solely of spiteful agents, destroys.

Thus, the agent’s endowment is fixed in most JD games, as we assume in the current analysis. Although it shares
this feature with spectator decisions, this is, nonetheless, treated as a stakeholder decision and, therefore, the
altruism term is included in the agent’s utility function. This is because the JD context casts the agent in a personal,
agent-patient relationship, similar to a dictator game, and not as a spectator choosing impartially for others.
9
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PROOF: See Appendix.
If the claim of Theorem 6.1 that only spiteful subjects destroy is correct, this implies 13-15% of
subjects in the studies cited in SF 6.1 are spiteful. Note that these percentages are not only very
consistent with one another across variations in this design but also are remarkably close to the
estimate of 14% spiteful agents cited in Section 5 using a different design.
SF 6.2: In JD games, destruction is directed mostly toward advantaged subjects, when
inequalities are unfair. That is, it is directed toward richer subjects, when endowments are
unearned (Zizzo, 2003, Zhang and Ortmann, 2013), but, when endowments are earned,
destruction is mostly aimed at richer subjects only if inequalities are unfair (Fehr, 2018).
THEOREM 6.2: In JD games, suppose fairness is based at least in part on an equity principle,
according to which the entitlement is increasing in earned contributions and equal for
unearned ones (Konow, 2000). Then, destruction is directed mostly toward those with
unfairly high endowments, i.e., richer subjects in games with unearned endowments, and,
in games with earned and unequal endowments, mostly toward richer subjects only if
inequalities are unfair. Specifically, altruistic and selfish agents, who comprise the
majority, only destroy earnings of unfairly advantaged patients, whereas spiteful agents
also destroy earnings of some unfairly disadvantaged patients. The richer the unfairly
advantaged patient, the more agents of all types destroy.
PROOF: See Appendix.
These findings underscore the importance of inequity aversion, whether the entitlement is equal
or not, as opposed to spite alone, in explaining much of the destruction in JD, money burning and
vendetta games such that even some altruistic subjects might engage in destruction.

7. Moral Egress
Some people will give money to a beggar but prefer to cross the street, if possible, to
avoid the beggar. Field experiments have established that avoidance of this kind is widespread.
Forewarning people of door-to-door charitable solicitations results in a large and significant drop
in the fraction of homeowners, who open their door at the pre-announced hour, compared to
those who are not forewarned and who give more generously and at a higher rate (DellaVigna,
List, and Malmendier, 2012). Placing Salvation Army bell-ringers at both of two entrances to a
supermarket, rather than just one that can be avoided, increases both the rate and level of
donations (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman, 2017). Laboratory experiments have found these
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results to be robust to controls for possible extrinsic motives, such as social pressure or social
image concerns. I call this anomaly moral egress: people comply with moral norms, when the
norms are salient and exit is prohibitively costly or impossible, but many prefer to exit a situation
with high moral salience, when possible.
Moral egress is one example of a class of widely studied anomalies I call “norm
avoidance” that involve situations in which agents may choose not only transfers but context
itself and, thereby, affect the salience of moral norms. I consider two other examples of norm
avoidance to this class of decisions, viz., willful ignorance and delegation, in Konow (2022a). I
add the following assumption to examples of norm avoidance (this appears as Assumption 1 in
the companion paper).
ASSUMPTION 8: Compared to moral salience in the standard dictator game (𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), moral
salience is lower with the availability of an option to avoid taking action on or acquiring

information about the consequences of one’s action (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ), even if the agent does not exercise that
option. Moral salience is lower still for those who actually exercise the option and choose to

avoid the action or information about the consequences of the action (𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ). That is, we assume
𝜎𝜎 ℎ > 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 > 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 > 0.

Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) introduced an experiment that sheds light moral egress.

Dictators first play a standard dictator game with $10. Then they are told for the first time that
they may either implement the division or exit the game with $9, in which case the Rs receive
nothing and never find out about the D decision. In the standard game, mean D transfers are at
the usual level of about 25% of the endowment, but up to 43% of Ds choose instead to exit and
take the $9. Exit is inconsistent with standard social preference models: selfish Ds should stay in
the game and take $10 instead of $9, whereas fair-minded Ds should also stay but share fairly.
The discussion here centers on a version of this experiment by Lazear, Malmendier and Weber
(2012) that extends the Dana et al. design and lends itself to further analysis. This version, which
I will call the “exit game,” is illustrated in Figure 5. Panel a shows their “no sorting” treatment,
which is a standard D game, and panel b illustrates a “sorting” treatment. In the sorting
treatment, Ds first choose whether to enter or to exit the D game. They know that, if they enter,
they will then proceed to make a decision about how much to transfer of their endowment, 𝑋𝑋. If
1

they choose to exit, they receive 𝑋𝑋 less a cost 𝑐𝑐, where 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 𝜂𝜂 = 2 𝑋𝑋. That is, in some

variations, the exit cost is zero, but, when positive, it is smaller than the common entitlement,
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which, as usual in simple D games with fixed stakes, I take to be equal splits.

b

𝑎𝑎
No sorting

X, 0

D

Sorting

D

Exit
0, X

X − c, 0

X, 0

Enter

D

0, X

FIGURE 5. – Exit game of Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2012).

Consider the following stylized facts from some experiments with exit options.
SF 7.1: In dictator games with exit, some dictators enter and transfer zero, some enter and
transfer a positive amount, and some exit. Those who exit are, on average, more generous
types than those who enter. Mean transfers in the exit game are lower than in the standard
dictator game without exit (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, 2007, Dana, Cain and
Dawes, 2006, Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2012).
For the analysis, Assumption 8 means that, relative to moral salience in the standard
dictator game with no exit (𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), the availability of an exit option lowers moral salience for those,
who elect to enter (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ), and moral salience is even lower for those who exit and avoid the

dictator decision altogether (𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ). Denote the utility of a D who enters the game 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, one who

exits 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, and one in a standard dictator game without any exit option 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈. Then, their utility
functions are

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼),

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼),

𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(−𝜂𝜂).

The following theorem explains the relationships between dictator choices in the exit

game based on salience and dictators’ moral preferences.
THEOREM 7.1: In the exit game, the least fair and least altruistic dictators enter and transfer
zero. More altruistic dictators are more likely to enter and transfer a positive amount than
to exit or to enter and transfer zero. Fairer dictators are more likely either to exit or to
enter and transfer a positive amount than to enter and transfer zero. Specifically, the
fairest dictators prefer to exit (enter and transfer zero), if the percentage reduction in
salience is greater (less) than the percentage increase in inequity aversion.
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PROOF: See Appendix.
Thus, the model indicates that those who enter and transfer zero are the least altruistic and least
fair dictators. Higher altruism leads to fewer zero transfers and less exit. Fairer dictators are more
likely to exit or to enter and transfer a positive amount, but how 𝜙𝜙 affects which of these is
chosen depends: if exiting reduces salience more than it increases inequity aversion (in

percentage terms), then the fairest dictators exit, an interpretation that is consistent with SF 7.1

and with generosity, in this game, being driven chiefly by fairness.
The following stylized fact compares mean transfers in the exit game with the standard
dictator game.
SF 7.2: In a dictator game with exit, mean transfers are lower than in the standard dictator game
without exit (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, 2007, Dana et al., 2006, Lazear et al.,
2012).
The theory is consistent with this SF for the different experimental designs with exit, but it is
worked out formally for the exit game in the following theorem.
THEOREM 7.2: In the exit game, mean transfers are lower among those who enter than in the
standard dictator game without exit.
PROOF: Moral salience is lower in the exit game (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ) than in the standard game without exit
(𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), so the optimal transfer 𝑥𝑥 is lower in the former by Theorem 2.1. Moreover, higher exit

among the most generous dictators, according to SF 1.1, reinforces the reduced giving in the exit
game.

Other findings from games with exit can be explained by changes in moral salience.
Lazear et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2017) find that exit increases, if agents must confront
patients face-to-face, and Dana et al. (2006) find that both exit and transfers fall, if Rs are never
told there was a dictator game regardless of whether the D exits. As described in section 4, such
procedural differences are expected to affect moral salience in the form of moral proximity:
moral salience increases with personal knowledge of the agent and even of the existence of the
agent in a capacity that can affect the patient. Another finding consistent with this model comes
from Lazear et al. (2012), who report a result from an exit game, which is stated and proven in
the following theorem.
THEOREM 7.3: In an exit game with a constant value of exit (𝑋𝑋� − 𝑐𝑐), the frequency of exit

decreases as the stakes of entering the game (𝑋𝑋) increase, assuming quite generally that
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

0 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≤ 1.

PROOF: See Appendix.
This result is due to the fact that, as the stakes rise, the utility from entering increases.
There are explanations other than moral salience for some of the experimental results on
exit. For instance, if the D chooses to exit, Rs do not find out about the dictator game in these
studies, which raises the question of whether Ds are responding to other forces such as social
image concerns or guilt aversion, i.e., disutility from giving less than what the R expects. On the
latter effect, the evidence is mixed, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find support for guilt
aversion in a strategic game with communication, whereas Ellingsen et al. (2010) find the effects
are close to zero in three games, including the dictator game. Regarding the former effect, I am
unaware of any tests of social image in experiments with exit, so one cannot rule it out. The
relative strengths of the moral egress argument are its simplicity and its position in the broader
theoretical framework of moral salience. It rests on the intuition that people sometimes distance
themselves from situations in which moral norms are salient, because norm compliance reduces
utility. In fact, there is supportive evidence of this, assuming utility corresponds to subjective
well-being: Ds, who are paired with Rs but given no opportunity to share their endowment with
them, are happier, on average, than Ds in a standard dictator game (Konow, 2010).

8. Classic Results
The theory introduced in this paper to explain anomalies is also consistent with classic
results on social preferences, as demonstrated in this section.
SF 8.1: There is a mass at null transfers in the standard dictator game without taking options
(e.g., 36%, on average, across multiple studies in the survey of Engel, 2011).
THEOREM 8.1: Suppose for the least fair dictators (i.e., those with 𝜙𝜙) in the standard game with
salience 𝜎𝜎 ∗ it is the case that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑋𝑋)�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝜙𝜙

transfers.

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(−𝜂𝜂)�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕. Then there is a mass at null

PROOF: In this game, transfers are constrained to be non-negative, so a corner solution results at
𝑥𝑥 = 0 among that fraction of dictators who are comparatively self-interested, i.e., for whom

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� (𝑋𝑋) ≥ 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝜙𝜙 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(−𝜂𝜂)� + 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(0, 𝛼𝛼)� . Specifically, sufficient conditions for this are
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
the mass of dictators, who are both the least fair and not altruistic (i.e., given the assumption
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Α(0) > 0).

SF 8.2: Some dictators in the standard game without taking make “super-fair” transfers, i.e.,
transfers of more than one-half (e.g., 13%, on average, across various studies in Engel,
2011, 6% in the Standard treatment in Konow, 2010). This is a minority of dictators that
is smaller than the fraction of those who make null transfers.
THEOREM 8.2: In the standard dictator game, a minority of dictators makes “super-fair”
transfers, which are not optimal in the absence of altruism.
PROOF: The assumption that 0 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(𝛼𝛼 ∗ ) < 0.5, where 𝛼𝛼 ∗ = {𝛼𝛼|

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂)
�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 = 𝛼𝛼 ∙
𝑎𝑎

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝜂𝜂, 𝛼𝛼)�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕} in this dictator game, implies there is a minority of dictators, whose optimal
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(0)�
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂)
∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝜂𝜂, 𝛼𝛼)�
�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 < 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝜙𝜙
transfers are super-fair, since for them
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 + 𝜎𝜎
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑎𝑎

when 𝑥𝑥 = 𝜂𝜂. Such transfers are never optimal in the absence of the altruism term since
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(0)�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂)
�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 > 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝜙𝜙
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 = 0.
𝑎𝑎

SF/THEOREM 8.3: Consistent with SF 8.1 and SF 8.2, assume that null transfers are more
numerous than super-fair transfers. Then the mean transfer in the standard dictator game
is strictly between zero and one-half of the stakes (e.g., Camerer, 2003, Engel, 2011).
PROOF: See Appendix.
On the basis of this theorem, one can disregard super-fair dictators, whenever the focus is on the
mean behavior of dictators in the standard game.
SF/THEOREM 8.4: In the standard dictator game, some dictators transfer amounts that equalize
or come close to equalizing allocations (e.g., Camerer, 2003, Engel, 2011).
PROOF: In a simple dictator game, which lacks information about effort, need or other
distributive norms, the entitlement reduces to equal splits according to Assumption 3. Combined
with Theorem 8.3, transfers closer to equality in these games are consistent with dictators, who
have higher values of 𝜙𝜙, possibly combined with higher values of 𝛼𝛼.

Note that strict equality does not emerge from fairness preferences alone, since 𝜙𝜙 < ∞, but it can
with the added effect of altruism.

In many dictator games, recipients are endowed. A design I call the “tax experiment”

� ) is distributed differently across
consists of dictator games in which a fixed total endowment (𝑀𝑀
� = 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌.
treatments between dictator (X) and recipient (Y), where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 and 𝑀𝑀
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SF/THEOREM 8.5: Crowding out is partial (or incomplete) in the tax experiment. Incomplete
crowding out means that the average dictator transfer, x, decreases by less than any
increase in the recipient’s endowment (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 1998, Korenok, Millner
and Razzolini, 2017, Cox, List, Price, Sadiraj, and Samek, 2019).
PROOF: See Appendix for the proof of incomplete crowding out, i.e., −1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 0.

Fairness alone predicts complete crowding out, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = −1, so the presence of altruism
generates the partial crowding out in this model.

Another piece of corroborating evidence for including altruism can be found in the study

of Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In what I will call the “futile dictator” experiment, the
experimenter makes a preset charitable donation, and dictators can also contribute to the charity,
but then the experimenter’s donation to the charity is reduced by the same amount as the
dictator’s gift, so that the amount received by the charity remains the same. Nevertheless, most
dictators (57%) contribute a significant fraction of their endowment (20%, on average). This
result is also consistent with conditional altruism, as proven in the following theorem.
THEOREM 8.6: Some dictators contribute a positive amount in the futile dictator experiment.
PROOF: See Appendix.
Such transfers cannot be explained by fairness but are consistent with agents, whose altruism is
sufficiently strong. The estimates from Crumpler and Grossman not only provide further support
for altruism (or warm glow) but are also consistent with our assumption that the lower bound on
the fraction of agents with altruistic preferences (𝛼𝛼 > 0) is greater than one-half.

Recipients are also endowed in what I call the “subsidy experiment,” viz., the dictator’s

endowment is held constant (𝑋𝑋�) while the recipient’s endowment is varied across treatments.

SF/THEOREM 8.7: Crowding out is partial in the subsidy experiment. Thus, the average dictator
transfer, x, decreases by less than any increase in the recipient’s endowment (e.g.,
Konow, 2010, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2012).
PROOF: See Appendix for the proof of partial crowding out, i.e., −1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 0.

Altruism alone predicts complete crowding out, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0, so this validates the inclusion
of fairness in the agent’s moral preferences.

SF/THEOREM 8.8: When moral norms are activated by the availability of choices (i.e., context
X) or by information (i.e., context Y), spectator and stakeholder allocations are
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significantly positively related to affected norms that involve inequality, including
equity/proportionality (e.g., Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002, Konow 2000, Konow,
Saijo and Akai, 2020, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2017, Oxoby and Spraggon,
2008), need (e.g., Benz and Meier, 2008, Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Konow, 2010,
2019, Müller and Renes, 2021, Traub and Kittel, 2020) and efficiency (Almås, Cappelen,
and Tungodden, 2020, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004,
Faravelli 2007).
PROOF: This follows from Assumption 3 and Theorem 2.5.

9. Conclusions
This paper proposes a tractable theory that explains both classic results on allocative
preferences as well as a wide range of anomalous findings about moral behavior, including moral
proximity, moral uncertainty, the taking effect, joy of destruction, and moral egress. At various
stages, I have discussed alternative explanations for specific phenomena, such as experimental
artefacts (e.g., Bardsley, 2008), motivated reasoning (e.g., Gino et al., 2016), moral identity
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2011), and social image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009),
including what I see as the strengths of those alternatives. As stated at the start, the goal is not to
dismiss or conduct a beauty contest with other accounts of specific phenomena. Instead, one goal
was to present an until now neglected explanation, which plausibly sweeps up much of the
variance in observed behavior. Another goal was to illustrate the theory’s flexibility and ease of
application, that is, to argue its appeal on the basis of Occam’s razor. A related aim was to
demonstrate the generality of the theory across an arguably unprecedented set of enigmatic
empirical results on moral preferences.
Future work could also analyze the factors that affect how different moral and non-moral
contexts might be integrated across different decisions at a point in time as well as over time.
That is, one could examine the effects on moral salience of presenting similar decisions while
varying the moral and non-moral context, which could, for example, account for order effects. In
addition, this paper focused on non-strategic decision-making in order to simplify the analysis
and to avoid factors that might confound inferences about the forces being studied. But further
work might extend the theory to situations involving strategic interaction, such as bargaining.
The moral preferences treated in the current paper are allocative preferences, but
evidence from many experiments indicate that agents are also motivated to sanction others, i.e.,
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to reward or punish others for their compliance or non-compliance, respectively, with allocative
preferences. Konow (2022a) presents new theoretical and empirical findings that build on the
current paper. It introduces a new theory of sanctioning, which is related to virtue ethics and is
called virtue preferences, and combines it with the theory of moral salience and conditional
altruism. This generalized theory is applied to explain classic findings on reward and punishment
called reciprocity as well as additional anomalies, including outcome bias (i.e., sanctioning
others for their uncontrollable luck), willful ignorance, and delegation. That paper also reports
the results of an original experiment that tests the theory out-of-sample and proves consistent
with the general theory, including with results discussed in both papers. Finally, whereas this
paper employs moral set salience, which involves subsets of context, Konow (2022a) also
discusses moral point salience, which involves individual elements of the context, to account for
masses at certain decisions. The complete theory extends the range of classic and anomalous
findings that can be explained and also provides guidance on distinguishing the contexts in
which a social preferences approach suffices and when it is necessary to extend it to take account
of moral salience and virtue preferences.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = −𝑢𝑢 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

letting subscripts on terms of the utility function denote partial derivatives with respect to the
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑓𝑓�
subscripted variable(s), e.g., 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 ≡ �𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 and 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 2 . Applying the implicit function
theorem to solve for 𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎), substituting into the first order condition, and differentiating with
respect to 𝜎𝜎,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
+ 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
+ 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
=0
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
or, rearranging,
−𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� =
> 0,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

since from the first order condition above 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 = 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 /𝜎𝜎 > 0.

Proof of Theorem 2.2
Noting 𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎), we can write the composite function 𝑥𝑥�𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛)�. By the chain rule
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

since 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0 by Theorem 2.1 and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0 by assumption.
Taking the second derivative,
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑 2 𝑥𝑥 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎 2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕 2 𝜎𝜎
� � +
=
>0
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎 2 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2
2
2
𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕 𝜎𝜎
since, by assumption, 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎2 ≥ 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2 > 0 given 𝑝𝑝 > 0.

Proof of Theorem 2.3
Solving for 𝑥𝑥(𝜙𝜙), substituting, and proceeding as before,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0.

−𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥
′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� =
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ⋛ 0 if 𝑓𝑓 ⋛ 0 as 𝑥𝑥 ⋚ 𝜂𝜂 − 𝑌𝑌.

Proof of Theorem 2.4
Solving for 𝑥𝑥(𝛼𝛼), substituting, and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼 = 0.
−𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� =
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 > 0.

Proof of Theorem 2.5
Solving for 𝑥𝑥(𝜂𝜂), substituting, and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 − 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =

𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

< 1.
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Proof of Theorem 6.1
𝑀𝑀
𝑌𝑌
Let 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑀𝑀 and suppose 𝜂𝜂 = 2 = 2. Then

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 (𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
⇒ 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥) = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼)
⇒ 𝛼𝛼 ⋛ 0 ⇒ 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 ⋛ 0 ⇒ 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 ⋚ 0 ⇒ 𝑥𝑥 ⋛ 0.
If 𝑥𝑥 is constrained, 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 0, then 𝑥𝑥 = 0 for 𝛼𝛼 ≧ 0 and 𝑥𝑥 < 0 only for 𝛼𝛼 < 0, which is a minority
according to the assumption that 0 < Α(0) < 0.5.
Proof of Theorem 6.2
The general form for the utility function of the agent in the JD game is
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).
The first order condition is
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
or

𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).
It follows that 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0 ⇒ 𝑥𝑥 < 0 only if 𝑌𝑌 > 𝜂𝜂. When 𝛼𝛼 < 0, 𝑥𝑥 < 0 if 𝑌𝑌 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 as well as for some
𝑌𝑌 < 𝜂𝜂.
Solving for 𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌), substituting it into the first order condition, and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
+ 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
=0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
⇒ −1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = −
<0
𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
for interior solutions, which implies destruction increases with the size of a patient’s unfair
advantage.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
First, consider those who enter. From Theorem 8.1 that follows, there is a mass of low altruism
and low fairness types who transfer nothing, indeed the necessary condition is satisfied a fortiori,
since salience is lower than in the standard dictator game, 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 < 𝜎𝜎 ℎ , and, by Theorem 2.1, the
optimal transfer here is even lower for all dictators. For those who enter, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4
apply, meaning the optimal transfer, and, therefore, the likelihood of giving a positive amount
rather than zero, is increasing in 𝛼𝛼 and in 𝜙𝜙 (note that, although 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0 for super-fair
dictators, this never prompts them to give less than 𝜂𝜂, let alone zero).
Second, the choice of exiting over entering and transferring zero implies a higher 𝜙𝜙, since
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(−𝜂𝜂) > 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(−𝜂𝜂),
which implies
𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐)
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 𝑋𝑋 ≡ 𝑙𝑙
> 0.
(𝜎𝜎 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 )𝑓𝑓(−𝜂𝜂)
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That is, in exit games with a positive exit cost (𝑐𝑐 > 0), there is a strictly positive fairness
threshold for exiting such those who exit have stronger fairness preferences than those who enter
and transfer zero.
Finally, consider the effects of moral preferences on the choices of exiting versus entering and
possibly transferring a positive amount. The effect of 𝛼𝛼 on the utility of exiting is zero since
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = 0
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼

The effect of 𝛼𝛼 on the utility of entering and transferring a positive amount is
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = −𝑢𝑢 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
= (−𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 )
+ 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 = 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 > 0
since −𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 = 0 for interior solutions and 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥�𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 0 for corner solutions.

Thus, the utility of entering and transferring a positive amount is increasing in 𝛼𝛼, so the share of
dictators doing so is increasing in 𝛼𝛼, since the utility of exiting is unaffected by 𝛼𝛼. The effect of
𝜙𝜙 on the utility of exiting is
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓(−𝜂𝜂) < 0.
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
The effect of 𝜙𝜙 on the utility of entering is
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = (−𝑢𝑢 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔 ) 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) < 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) < 0
When the optimal 𝑥𝑥 > 0, exiting becomes more (less) attractive if
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� > (<) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� , or
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
⇔ 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓(−𝜂𝜂) > (<)𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)
𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
𝑓𝑓(−𝜂𝜂) − 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂)
⇔
>
(<)
.
𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓(−𝜂𝜂)

Proof of Theorem 7.3
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is fixed at 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋� − 𝑐𝑐) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(−𝜂𝜂), since 𝑋𝑋� and 𝑐𝑐 are fixed. The first order condition for an
interior solution with a dictator who enters is
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = −𝑢𝑢 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓 (𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0.
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
Differentiating with respect to 𝑋𝑋, 𝑥𝑥(𝑋𝑋) and 𝜂𝜂(𝑋𝑋),
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
−𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
+ 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
− 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
+ 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
=0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
⇒0<
=
< 1.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
The effect of 𝑋𝑋 on 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 evaluated at the optimal 𝑥𝑥 is
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
� = 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 − 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥
+ 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥
− 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥
+ 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
+ (−𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 )
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥
>0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
since 0 ≤ �𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 1 and, from the first order condition, (−𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 ) = 0 such
= 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥

that 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 > 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 . Thus, as 𝑋𝑋 rises, so does 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, whereas 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 stays the same and more Ds choose
entry over exit.
Proof of Theorem 8.3:
In the standard dictator game, the minimum and maximum transfers are zero and X, respectively.
Denote the null transfer 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 , where 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 = 0, and its frequency 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 . Denote the average super-fair
1
transfer 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 , where 2 𝑋𝑋 < 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 ≤ 𝑋𝑋, and the frequency of super-fair transfers 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 . Denote the
1

average transfer between 0 and one-half 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 , where 0 < 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 ≤ 2 𝑋𝑋, and its frequency 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 . Suppose

𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 , 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 , 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∈ (0,1). Finally, note that 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 = 1, and, according to SF 3.2, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 < 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 .
Then the average transfer equals
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 .
First, note that 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) > 0, since 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 = 0 and 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 > 0, 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 > 0, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 > 0, and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 > 0. Next, show
1
1
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) < 2 𝑋𝑋. Consider 𝑥𝑥𝐺𝐺 at its maximum value 2 𝑋𝑋, and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 at its maximum value 𝑋𝑋. Note that
𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑋𝑋 = (𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ) 𝑞𝑞
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻

𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 +𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻

1

𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻

𝑁𝑁 +𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻

1

∙ 𝑋𝑋 < (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ) 2 𝑋𝑋 , since 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 = 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 = 1 − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 , and
1

< 2 from the fact that 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 < 𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 . Then, the least upper bound of 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) is 2 𝑋𝑋:
1

1

1

1

𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 2 𝑋𝑋 + [𝑞𝑞𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑋𝑋] < 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ∙ 2 𝑋𝑋 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 ) 2 𝑋𝑋 = 2 𝑋𝑋.

Proof of Theorem 8.5
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢�𝑀𝑀 − 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = −𝑢𝑢 �𝑀𝑀 − 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0.
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Substituting 𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌) and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑢𝑢

−𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 −𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

< 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

Note that, in the absence of altruism, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = −1.

Proof of Theorem 8.6
Let Y denote the preset experimenter donation and y the amount by which the experimenter
reduces the recipient’s (R’s) earnings. Then R earns 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑌𝑌 since 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦.
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = −𝑢𝑢 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

in the case of interior solutions. The assumptions that 𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛼𝛼 ∗ ) > 0 where 𝛼𝛼 ∗ ≡
{𝛼𝛼|𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) = 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 (𝜂𝜂, 𝛼𝛼)} ⟹ 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 (𝑋𝑋) < 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 (0, 𝛼𝛼) ∋ 𝛼𝛼 ∗ > 0∀𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼 ∗ , who form the fraction
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0.5 > Α(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛼𝛼 ∗ ) > 0 plus, on the margin of 𝛼𝛼 ∗ , some 𝛼𝛼 for whom 𝛼𝛼 ∗ ≥ 𝛼𝛼 > 0.

Proof of Theorem 8.7
Since the total stakes, 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌, vary, the entitlement, 𝜂𝜂, would be impacted according to most
distributive principles. Given the simple context, equality is a reasonable assumption, but I make
the weaker assumption that 𝜂𝜂 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 1.
Then 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑥𝑥, and
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢�𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼),
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = −𝑢𝑢 �𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑋𝑋� + 𝑥𝑥� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0.
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Substituting 𝑥𝑥(𝑌𝑌) and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(1 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =

−𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 (1−𝑡𝑡)

𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥

< 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

Note that, in the absence of fairness, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0.
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